In his Apology, Plato famously quoted Socrates, saying, “The unexamined life is not worth living.” I first heard this quote on my first day of college, and it has been an integral tenet of my education. All of my professors have challenged me to examine my life, the lives of those who came before me, and the implications of history and current events on the lives of those who will come long after I am gone. Emphasis both in class and in the world around me on issues of things like race, class, gender, religion, freedom, expression, right action, and countless others have forced me to face some challenging questions.
Clearly, there are inequalities and injustices in the world. All of these problems seem so big and complex, and they make me feel hopeless sometimes because there do not seem to be any real solutions. I am always thinking along several trains of thought at any given time. It’s pretty loud inside my brain. If you’re a contemplative insomniac with OCD like myself, you can imagine how allowing issues like these to become salient in your life and in your subconscious could create some problems. As annoying as it may be to spend hours contemplating things like the wage gap and child abuse when I would rather be sleeping, I have to realize that the fact that these injustices upset me so much is probably a good thing because it points to the strength of the morals that make me human and compassionate. This is not to say that people who get their eight hours in every night are not moral, compassionate people, of course, but it is to say that this phenomenon is an expression of virtue.
Aristotle says that the life of contemplation is the highest of the intellectual virtues. I can confidently call myself a contemplative person (even though Aristotle wouldn’t say so because I’m a woman, but that’s for a different blog). However, I am a bit perplexed as to how this contemplation in itself constitutes virtue because virtuous activity is supposed to bring pleasure to the virtuous person. I’m not perfect, but I would generally consider myself virtuous, and yet I do not feel pleasure upon contemplation of gentrification or human trafficking. I believe this is where Aristotle and I differ most widely. I don’t think intellectual virtue is enough. Contemplating things like God and literature is fine and should be pleasurable, but I believe we were gifted with reason and a moral conscience in order to understand problems and find ways to help. We shouldn’t feel pleasure in simply being contemplative when it comes to issues like restriction of civil liberties and the drug trade. Intellectual virtue is not enough in this situation. These sorts of contemplation should cause the virtuous person pain and inspire her or him to take action in order to prevent further injustice.
Carolyn's Blog 
Really well expressed, Carolyn. A couple of thoughts. Instead of thinking of “inequality” as a single evil, consider types of inequality – is inequality in opportunity the same as inequality in result? Is inequality in final or current position the same as inequality in starting place? As far as the virtue of contemplation is concerned, I don’t think it means that thinking of human trafficking is supposed to make you happy, but I do think there is an inherent joy in being able to comprehend and tussle with issues. The virtue is in the willingness to consider facts and points of view and objectives. Some people never take the time to think about such things; there is virtue is exercising your mind and heart to examine.
Good job.
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Maybe the following tidbits will give you pause in thinking you are so opposed to Aristotle:
1) I could be wrong, but I’m pretty sure contemplation (THEORIA) is not exactly an intellectual virtue. I believe it is an exercise of the intellectual virtue of intuitive reason (NOUS).
2) A doesn’t think we contemplate just anything. The activity of contemplation is limited by its objects. I think these objects are universal truths (perhaps something akin to Plato’s forms) or first principles of reason that cannot be demonstrated but only grasped intuitively. So I’m not sure that what is keeping you up at night would count as contemplation for Arist.
3) There is a kind of pleasure for Aristotle that is not to be associated with “happy feeling” but more or less identified with unimpeded activity (see book VII) or with what completes activity (see book X). So to take pleasure in an activity can be thought of as doing it well or without impediments. But notice that I might (e.g.) see the corpse of my friend well (the sight follows from a well-functioning faculty), but there’s a sense in which the activity is unimpeded because I’m not able to attend to this sight as good. In the same way, its arguable that contemplating disturbing truths is not pleasurable for Aristotle, inasmuch as the thought of their inherent badness impedes my activity.
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